Jen decided to launch Drop the Chalk as a for-profit company in order to maximize the impact the company could make. She felt that if she could charge schools for the software, she would be able to ensure that customer schools were deriving value from Drop the Chalk's solution: if they didn't find it valuable, they wouldn't renew their subscriptions! She also wanted to build a sustainable funding mechanism for the company over the long term. In order to scale to schools nationwide, Jen thought she would need to attract commercial capital, and she struggled to find financing when she decided to turn Drop the Chalk into a commercial innovation. New Orleans only had a small angel investing ecosystem, and most individuals and families with financial resources preferred more risk-averse investment opportunities. Launching as a for-profit also disqualified her from many grant opportunities. Jen had a great background and a product with strong customer feedback, but no way to go to scale.
Rajesh's experience put SABRAS on a firm footing at its launch. His network of 6,000 salt workers was producing revenue for the company from its first day, and Rajesh had developed an innovation that significantly improved customers' lives. He designed and prototyped a solar-powered salt pump that replaced the diesel option, cutting production costs as well as the massive pollution created by the operation. He also developed an innovative financing mechanism-salt producers would pay loans back in salt! Rajesh began by seeking investment from a handful of the 50+ funds focused on impact investing in India. Although he had not had difficulty raising grant dollars for previous nonprofit efforts serving the agariyas, most of the impact-focused, forprofit capital in India was focused on the later stages. Larger funds such as Acumen Fund, LGT Venture Philanthropy, and Aavishkaar typically like to see a track record, a history of revenue, and a fast-growing customer base before investing; an entrepreneur such as Rajesh in the pilot/proof-of-concept stage is typically not far enough along to be a candidate. Despite initial traction, Rajesh had nowhere to go for support.
Why did Jen and Rajesh struggle to get off the ground? They were hindered by several structural problems in impact investing that also systematically stunt the growth of seed-stage programs.
• Difficult economics behind seed investing and lack of liquidity in the market.
Seed investors in the social capital markets are both building a market and investing in it. The traditional path to profitability in the technology sector (bet on 10 risky investments and hope that one becomes a home run, such as Google) becomes more difficult in the seed stage because there is currently limited liquidity in impact investments (that is, a shortage of acquisitions, secondary sales, and IPOs). The cost of hiring a talented team and sourcing, innovations / volume 6, number 3 135
analyzing, and supporting deals has made seed funding prohibitively expensive. Jen won a business plan competition at Tulane for $10,000 and another at the University of Pennsylvania for $20,000-financing that was helpful but insufficient.
•Grant and fellowship programs: Organizations, most notably Ashoka and Echoing Green, have done remarkable work in supporting seed-stage entrepreneurs. Echoing Green supports an entrepreneur's personal livelihood for two years at $60,000 per year, and Ashoka provides a similar amount to selected fellows for three years; it has supported almost 3,000 fellows since it began 30 years ago. While these programs have changed the game for seed-stage support, they are limited in scalability because of the high cost per fellow. Echoing Green, for example, is only able to select 15-20 fellows per year.
•Angel investor collaboratives: Groups such as Investors' Circle, which focuses primarily on U.S.-based businesses, Toniic, which focuses mostly on emerging market enterprises, and the Europe-based PYMWYMIC (Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is Company) gather angel investors and host entrepreneurs for pitches and shared diligence. These organizations can be incredibly catalytic in helping enterprises that need to put together seed-stage rounds.
To date, however, the number of seed-stage investments made through these networks is small: in 2010, these networks syndicated fewer than five seed rounds among all members put together. Moreover, entrepreneurs sometimes find the application process opaque and time-consuming.
•Impact investment funds: While over $25 billion has been committed in more than 100 documented social venture funds, according to an industry survey I conducted, four openly invest less than US$100,000 per deal. Groups such as Rajesh applied to Dasra Social-Impact in the fall of 2009, looking for a network to help build his company. Almost 10 years ago, Deval Sanghavi and Neera Nundy cofounded Dasra to support social entrepreneurs in India. In Dasra's early years, the organization was nonprofit oriented, but as impact investing began to grow in India, Dasra developed the capacity to work with for-profit entrepreneurs as well. Dasra partnered with Social-Impact International, an enterprise support organization founded by the KL Felicitas Foundation, to launch Dasra Social-Impact, with an eye toward attracting the best social enterprises-nonprofit and for-profit-from across the country.
The heart of programs such as Idea Village and Dasra is the peer cohort, a group of for-profit social entrepreneurs at similar stages who meet regularly. Both Jen and Rajesh were grouped with high-impact start-up entrepreneurs who were facing similar challenges. They held regular meetings to review business models, discuss strategy, and work through similar problems. The two entrepreneurs knew they could count on receiving support or mentoring or on becoming part of a network through these accelerators, but they were expecting the source to be famous entrepreneurs or resident experts. When they started their programs, however, they found that the bulk of their learning and feedback came from their closest confidants, toughest critics, and most proactive supporters-their peers. Yet they still needed investors. While most accelerators did not have investment capital to put to work, Jen and Rajesh were excited to find that a partner investor had committed a substantial seed investment to the cohort. In the most unusual twist, allocation of the investment was to be determined not by the investor or a professional committee but by the cohort members themselves. Along with their peers, Jen and Rajesh assessed one another at the end of the incubation period, and the precommitted seed investment went to whomever the peers judged most investment ready. Peer allocation of investment is at the heart of the organization I run, Village Capital. In 2009, we created Village Capital as an initiative of the seed fund First Light in order to address many of the gaps in the seed-stage ecosystem outlined above. We thought of the concept of the "village bank" in microfinance, where microentrepreneurs, receiving $100 loans through self-help groups, lower the cost of putting capital to work by performing many of the tasks that loan officers would in a bank-coaching one another, demanding accountability, making loan decisions, and monitoring repayment. We also asked ourselves, why wouldn't this work for start-up companies? We had seen the power of peer groups in other concepts-professional networks such as YPO Forum, university student organizations, the Rotary Club, and political organizations, and we thought that community could certainly power enterprise growth in this sector.
But we needed partners. We surveyed potential partners worldwide and found four groups with whom to pilot the concept: in addition to Idea Village and Dasra Social-Impact, we piloted the Village Capital model with the Bay Area Hub Ventures and the Unreasonable Institute in Boulder. We found incubators with a strong cohort of entrepreneurs and a program that included a significant amount of peer-to-peer interaction, which we felt would create the strong bonds we were looking for. We announced that precommitted investment would be decided by the peers themselves, which led Nathaniel Whittemore of Change.org to say of the program, "It's as if microfinance and angel investing had a baby."
In Jen's case, Village Capital helped her build a sales and marketing strategy for her company. The entrepreneurs met weekly in New Orleans for 12 weeks; Jen pitched to her fellow entrepreneurs repeatedly, which prepared her innovations / volume 6, number 3 139 not only for investor pitches but also for sales cycles. Being able to communicate Drop the Chalk's impact and value to people not familiar with education reform significantly improved her ability to be an advocate for her software. At the end of 12 weeks, the Idea Village peer group voted on one another's proposals. Jen learned that she and fellow entrepreneur John Burns-whose company, Jack and Jake's, is building a local agriculture supply chain in New Orleansreceived $100,000 each. With that money, Jen was able to hire enough technical and programming support to pilot Drop the Chalk in New Orleans. Jen said that even if she hadn't received the investment, the peer support and feedback from the program were enough to have made the experience worth it for her. Nevertheless, the money sure was helpful in building Drop the Chalk! Rajesh's experience with Village Capital helped him build some structure around the development of SABRAS. While he had some early success with his customers, his peer reviewers tore up his business model and financial plan for the salt production and processing, and for the solar pump. Thanks in large part to his peer group, Rajesh was able to develop a coherent business plan, an easy-to-understand slide presentation, and solid financials for the first time. At the end of the program, Rajesh's peers selected him for a $75,000 investment. Rajesh gained structure, stability, and much-needed investment to pilot the solar pumps and launch SABRAS.
LESSONS FROM VILLAGE CAPITAL
What did we learn from the Village Capital experience, and how can it influence the impact investing sector in the seed stage?
Follow the 80-20 rule. Seed-stage work is expensive. Because of the low dollar amount that is invested in the seed stage (relative to later-stage investments), investors face tight margins on investment. Similarly, enterprise support organizations such as incubators can face high overhead costs because staff members provide hands-on support. With Village Capital, we found that the peers provided much of the support that an executive-in-residence or an investment analyst might provide for a similar organization. The 80-20 rulebe 80 percent as effective at 20 percent the cost-applies with the tight margins and limited resources in seed-stage investing. When peers can help one another with marketing, business models, publicity events, and more, the model is more scalable than the alternative.
People-powered capital changes investors, support organizations, and investees. Democratizing the flow of capital has significantly accelerated the seed-stage investing space. Investors often have a transformational experience as they move from "moneybags" to "mentor"-one Village Capital investor said that he was tired of being asked for money all the time. The Village Capital model of allowing entrepreneurs to make the investment decisions gave him the ability to build relationships with the entrepreneurs as more than only a funder. On the investee side, having the power to allocate capital is also transformative. Incubator partners in the pilots reported that entrepreneurs' attendance in peer group sessions was higher than in previous years, the peer review was more intense-and in some cases more critical!-than it had been in the past because real money was in play, and in the end, a more serious, more comprehensive, and much closer cohort emerged. One year after the completion of the pilots, 90 percent of the entrepreneurs in peer cohorts continued to meet in person or virtually.
Democratizing capital helps support organizations as well. The Unreasonable Institute has addressed the financial sustainability problem incubators face by making participants raise funds to cover the program tuition. The Idea Village has kept a revolving loan fund available to the cohort: entrepreneurs can take out loans, and the money from repaid loans is then available to other Idea Village entrepreneurs. In 18 months, the fund has had a 100 percent repayment rate.
Layered capital is necessary. Village Capital would not be possible without (a) grant-funded incubator partners who are able to manage peer groups and provide the infrastructure for peer support; and (b) precommitted investment dollars from First Light or another partner investor. With the relative youth of impact investing, grant dollars for building ecosystems and investment dollars for building companies can work hand-in-hand to build up the sector. Because of the challenges and risks of seed-stage investing and the youth of the market, neither nonprofit or for-profit dollars alone can build a market.
Foundations and governments are getting the picture regarding the catalytic role they can play in the seed stage of investing. First Light and the Shell Foundation have launched a year-long pilot that will invest in three to four companies in India, with the ultimate goal of creating a sustainable roadmap for seed funding in that country. The New Orleans Startup Fund is a 501(c)3 that uses state government funds and nonprofit donations to make risk-tolerant, seed-stage equity investments in start-ups expected to have a positive impact on the New Orleans area. In short, a lot of market-making needs to happen at the seed level, and private dollars alone cannot do it.
Investors: "Get to yes." On the investor side, there's always a reason to say no. There are almost no "slam-dunk" seed investing opportunities worldwide, as every enterprise has a million risks. Instead of saying no to everything, investors need to find a way to "get to yes"-put conditions on an enterprise (for example, "hire a COO and then I'll invest"); make a commitment based on a matching investment; spend some time building a financial model. Investors need to do more "company-building" and less "company-selecting." Most of the time and energy dedicated to seed investing goes to sourcing and due diligence; cutting the cost of putting capital to work can increase bandwidth (that is, the innovations / volume 6, number 3 141 resources needed to complete a task or project) in company-building. We've found a way to do this in Village Capital. Investors precommit their money to companies and invest in the one the peers choose. The Village Capital portfolio has been strong, and it is comparable to those of the average enterprises receiving investment from impact funds or angel networks. The difference is that organizing peer cohorts takes less time and money than managing a diligence process and it also empowers the entrepreneurs. By precommitting resources, investors force themselves to "get to yes" immediately, and then to build the companies that the process produces. Entrepreneurs: view investors as partners, not checkbooks. On the entrepreneur side, enterprises need to understand that impact investing is risky and seed-stage impact investing is even riskier. If the company does financially well, for-profit investors want to participate in the profits created. Entrepreneurs often ask for "softer" terms of investment, thinking that impact investors are not as commercially rigorous as a typical Silicon Valley angel. This is a dangerous assumption. Investors will be turned off by entrepreneurs who treat them as softer than average, and if current investors do not share in the upside of a company's success, the sector will have a harder time attracting commercial capital. Entrepreneurs need to view investors as true partners, rather than capital providers, if they are to achieve maximum impact. In our experience at Village Capital, the bulk of the friction between precommitted investment and the entrepreneur cohort has been over the term sheets. Surprisingly, the more experienced entrepreneurs, who likely know how difficult it is to raise money and find a good investor partner, have pushed back less on terms than the firsttime entrepreneurs.
It's not about the money-but the money helps. One entrepreneur said to me, "I have no shortage of free advice." As impact investing grows, so do the number of organizations providing support to enterprises, but there are already dozens of organizations worldwide that do this well. If a government, foundation, or investor partner wants to make an impact on social enterprises, putting money directly into companies-or supporting entities that do-is probably where the need is greatest.
NEXT STEPS FOR SABRAS, DROP THE CHALK, AND VILLAGE CAPITAL Jen and Rajesh wrapped up their respective programs in spring 2010, each receiving seed investment allocated by their peers. In the past year, both of their organizations have grown tremendously. Rajesh has built up SABRAS's processing and sales capacity to the point where the company is cash-flow positive. He has piloted the solar-powered pump technology with two farmers and is developing an operational plan to scale to 50 farmers in the next year. The farmers piloting the pump have increased their take-home pay 150 percent. Rajesh is currently raising $1.5 million to scale the company and has strong buy-in from potential investment partners.
Drop the Chalk piloted in 2010-2011 in 15 schools in New Orleans. Based on its initial success, Drop the Chalk raised $750,000, with buy-in from local funds (New Orleans Startup Fund), well-respected impact investment players (Calvert Foundation), and technology angels. Drop the Chalk is now poised for success next year: it has 87 percent customer retention and already has contracts with schools in nine cities across the country.
And we at Village Capital are finding strong program feedback beyond the pilot. We have launched eight programs worldwide, with 98 percent positive feedback from entrepreneurs and more than 100 enterprises supported. The average participant raises $75,000 in seed funding in the six months following the end of their peer cohort meetings. Village Capital has incorporated into a separate nonprofit so we can build the infrastructure of seed-stage investing, and we are partnering with for-profit investors beyond First Light to launch additional programs. We partnered with First Light and the Hub Ventures fund for our most recent program in the Bay Area, and for our upcoming Village Capital program in London, we will be partnering with Merism Capital.
Most players in the social capital markets assume the good companies are out there-you just have to try really hard to find them. In reality, 99 percent of the promising companies need risk-tolerant money and heavy support. Fortunately, innovation across the sector is building the seed-stage ecosystem, which will provide returns well beyond financing for the social capital markets.
Portions of this article have been adapted from "Village Capital: Using Peer Support to Accelerate Impact Investing," winner of the NextBillion 2011 Case Writing Competition and available at GlobaLens.com.
